

NSC BRIEFING

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17 May 1955

Agenda for "Summit"
~~SOVIET MOVES CONTINUE~~

- I. USSR last week continued a drumfire of diplomatic moves designed to:
 - A. Cash in on favorable world reaction to highly dramatized "good deed in a naughty world"--i.e., Soviet liberality in concluding the Austrian treaty, signed 15 May.
 - B. Press toward and take credit for reduction international tension through negotiations "at summit" this summer.
 - C. Persuade West Europeans in particular and non-Communist world generally that:
 1. USSR wants major East-West detente and reciprocal disarmament;
 2. within this context, rearmament of West Germany is menace to European peace and security rather than gain of strength for NATO coalition.
- II. These Soviet moves are full of propaganda but they are not just propaganda gimmicks:
 - A. USSR is taking the political offensive with a plan of attack as carefully worked out and coordinated as one of Zhukov's massive battlefield assaults.
 - B. Soviet aim is to weaken US position in Western Europe and stop or minimize rearmament of West Germany within NATO.

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III. USSR has laid down main lines of its negotiating position in elaborate proposals on disarmament and ending cold war--sprung last week at London disarmament talks and since then plugged heavily by Soviet leaders.

A. Core of position is Soviet willingness to agree to:

1. Reasonably realistic disarmament scheme;
2. System of general security guarantees of any kind (LOCARNO or UN regional grouping) that would satisfy West Europeans as manifest of Soviet peaceful intent.

B. USSR can go long way in negotiating from this position because:

1. General war in Europe not in Soviet interest in foreseeable future;
2. Pushing US off Eurasian continent easier by political pressures on Western Europeans than military moves, which Soviet leaders know are very dangerous in hydrogen age.

IV. USSR is trying to capture good words in popular lexicon, like "peace"--"disarmament"--"neutrality" and "independence" of small nations.

V. Thus USSR portrays US as advocate of high-levels military expenditures, imminence of war, and necessity of all nations to line up "for or against" US or USSR.

VI. Soviet keynote of the week was demonstration of "good faith" in sending Molotov to Vienna to sign Austrian treaty on schedule as promised amid great fanfare and rejoicing.

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- VII. Molotov, following Bulganin's favorable comments on prospects of "summit" meeting, promptly accepted US-UK French invitation to hold four-power meeting.
- VIII. Premier Bulganin on behalf of the USSR concluded the Warsaw Pact (8-power Soviet Bloc treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, signed 14 May) which set up a unified military force but carefully:
- A. Made clear that non-Communist states will be welcomed into the Warsaw Pact;
 - B. Promised that the Warsaw Pact and its military defense system would lapse if a general security treaty in Europe came into effect.
- IX. The USSR evidently is building up the Warsaw Pact organization to look like a rough "equivalent" of NATO--maybe in order to argue later on that both will become obsolete in the event of a reduction of world tension, agreement on disarmament, and conclusion of a general system of mutual security guarantees.
- X. Moscow also carefully gave East Germany a special relationship with the Warsaw Pact defense system by announcing that the participation of East German armed forces in the unified command would "be examined later."
- A. Postponing creation of a formal East German army will whet West German interest in Soviet propaganda on German reunification.

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- D. East German Premier Grotewohl at Warsaw said new Soviet Bloc treaty left East Germany free to negotiate on German reunification.
 - E. Moscow is trying to make East Germany in relation to the Warsaw Pact system seem roughly equivalent to West Germany in relation to NATO.
- XI. The USSR may hope to sell the idea that some scheme of reciprocal limitation of armament in the "two Germanies" could be part of a general security system.
- A. Some such scheme foreshadowed by 10 May Soviet proposal for strict limitation of local police contingents in both parts of Germany.
 - B. Under such an arrangement and with considerable reduction of tension, USSR might in long run be willing to withdraw most of its powerful military group of forces from East Germany, counting on political power and security police to maintain essential Soviet control.
 - C. In this way USSR could impose safe limits on West German contribution to NATO without giving up East Germany.
- XII. This saving-out of East Germany as bargaining counter is probably most serious sign that USSR means business in negotiations at "summit."
- A. Ambassador Bohlen said several weeks ago tipoff to earnestness of Soviet wish for a settlement of the German problem would be failure to incorporate East Germany in Warsaw Pact defense system.

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B. Soviet interest in a detente and a German settlement is not in any sense a Soviet willingness to surrender, and that is why the "two Germanies" concept (with mutual arms limitation) looks like the favored Soviet solution.

XIII. Moscow showed how far it was willing to go in "normalizing" relations and permitting independence and neutrality on the part of small nations in Europe by announcing on 13 May that a top-level Soviet delegation including Shushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan would go to Belgrade late this month to discuss international affairs with the formerly much-vilified Communist apostate, Tito.

A. This team of travelling Soviet good-will salesmen is precisely the same one that went to Peiping last October to establish a firm understanding on Sino-Soviet relations.

B. They are the most prominent men in Moscow these days and their willingness to take the trek to Belgrade will have a strong impact on Western European opinion as evidence of a basic change of heart in the USSR.

XIV. ChiComs likely to try hard to consolidate their political position with other Asian states before resorting to major military operations in Formosa Straits.

A. If Sino-US negotiations not undertaken, Peiping has high hopes of directing general disappointment against US.

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- B. If negotiations are held, ~~Chicom~~ likely to try induce withdrawal of US forces, after which Formosa would be "liberated" by "peaceful means"--that is, by negotiating with undefended ~~China~~.
 - C. This formula would enable Peiping to renounce use of force against Formosa--at least, as Chou En-lai said in 13 May statement, "as far as possible." Many governments could be expected to sympathize with this ~~Chicom~~ approach.
- XV. Soviet references to Far Eastern questions also stressed theme of negotiations and peace.
- A. Bulganin at Warsaw stressed Soviet support of Peiping's attitude on Formosa "and those steps which People's China is undertaking to strengthen peace in that area."
- XVI. Chinese Communists have moved in past few weeks to bring policies toward Asian states closer into line with Soviet policies in Europe.
- A. Chou at Bandung publicly and privately committed Peiping to peaceful aims and methods. Back home in Peiping, Chou plausibly defended his tactics as having reduced suspicions and gained ground toward enlarging neutralist area.
 - B. Viet Minh delegates backed Chou by expressions of good neighborliness, particularly toward Laos and Cambodia.
 - 1. With regard to unification of Vietnam, Viet Minh said to have privately expressed willingness to exercise patience.

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XVII. Interesting "sleeper" in the Soviet disarmament proposals is that proposed force levels include "China" as one of the "permanent members" of the UN Security Council and the USSR states that the obligations of "China" under the disarmament plan "should be examined with the participation of the People's Republic of China."

- A. It is hard to see how the whole plan could get anywhere unless it ends in admission of Communist China to the UN.
- B. Hence Soviet stress on the UN content of disarmament and careful coordination of Soviet moves in Europe with Sino-Soviet moves in the Far East.